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LET'S SAY GOOD-BYE TO RES GESTAE
Chris Blairt
INTRODUCTION
The phrase res gestae has long since outlived any usefulness it ever had.
Although the phrase may have played some beneficial role in the development
of the law of hearsay and uncharged misconduct evidence, it has been widely
criticized for being useless and harmful. It is useless because the concepts in-
cluded within res gestae can all be explained by reference to other more refined
principles of evidence law. It is harmful because it causes confusion of eviden-
tiary principles and acts as a deterrence to principled analysis of evidentiary
concepts. The concepts once analyzed as res gestae have now been more pre-
cisely codified in the Oklahoma Evidence Code without the use of the words
res gestae. As a result, the time has come to finally abandon the use of the term
in favor of the analysis envisioned by the Code.
HISTORY OF RES GEsTAE
Res gestae is a Latin phrase which means "things done"1 and generally
refers to words and/or actions that "occur so close in time and substance" to
each other that they are considered part of the same happening, event or trans-
action.2 Although the phrase first appeared as early as 1637,' it was not in
common use until the early nineteenth century.4
The phrase initially developed as an exception to the hearsay rule for state-
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. BLACK'S LAW DIcONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990).
2. Id.
3. JOHN WIGMOR, 6 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1767 n.1 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976) (citing Ship Mon-
ey Case, 3 How.St.Tr. 825, 988 (1637)).
4. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1767, citing a lengthy passage from Professor James B. Thayer,
Bedingfield's Case-Declarations as a Part of the Res Gestae, 15 AM. L. REV. 1, 5-10 (1881) which stated that
although the term "res gestae" did not appear in Peake's "Law'of Evidence," published in 1801, the term did
appear in a treatise titled Evans Appendix to Pothier on Obligations, printed in 1806. Thayer determined that
the phrase first appeared in a Massachusetts case in 1808, in Bartlett v. Delprat, 4 Mass. 702. The term first
appeared in an American treatise, "Swift's Digest of the Law of Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases" in
1810.
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ments which were associated with the happening of the principal litigated event,
such as a murder, a collision, or a trespass.' Eventually, though, the term
"seemed to embody the notion that evidence of any concededly relevant act or
condition might also bring in the words which accompanied it."6 Thus, the con-
duct and the accompanying words were all part of the same transaction or the
"things done," and if the conduct was admissible, so were the words.
As the hearsay doctrine was ref'med over the years, the concept of res
gestae evolved into the hearsay exceptions that we now recognize as present
sense impressions,7 excited utterances,8 and statements of then existing mental,
emotional, or physical condition.9 The term has also been used to explain the
admissibility of words that we now would refer to as verbal acts or verbal parts
of acts.'0
Although the phrase initially developed as a hearsay concept, res gestae
has also been used to explain the admissibility of evidence of uncharged mis-
conduct" committed in conjunction with the crime for which the defendant is
being prosecuted.' Although the uncharged misconduct evidence would not be
admissible to prove that the defendant acted in conformity with his character,'3
it was said to be admissible because the uncharged misconduct was a part of a
5. See CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 268 (4th ed. 1992).
6. Id.
7. See id. See also FED. R. EVlD. 803(1) and OKLA. STAT. tit.12, § 2803(1) (1991), which provide that
"[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the
event or condition, or immediately thereafter[.]"
8. See id. See also FED. R. EVID. 803(2) and OKLA. STAT. tit 12, §2803(2) which provide that "[a]
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excite-
ment caused by the event or condition[.]"
9. See id. See also FED. R. EVID. 803(3) and OKLA. STAT. tit 12, § 2803(3) (1991) which provides:
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation or physical condition,
such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain and bodily health, but not including a state-
ment of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution,
revocation or identification or terms of declarant's will[.]
10. See WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1767; see also McCoRMICK, supra note 5, § 249. Such words, e.g.
the words of offer and acceptance to prove the formation of a contract, are not hearsay because they are not
being offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to prove only that the words
were spoken or written.
11. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE §6:20 (Callaghan 1984). The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence and the Oklahoma Evidence Code refer to such evidence as "other crimes, acts or
wrongs." See also FED. R. EvID. 404(b) and OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2404(b) (1991) which provide:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of
mistake or accident.
The same concept is sometimes referred to as "prior bad acts." See, e.g., William Roth, Understanding
Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts: A Diagrammatic Approach, 9 PEPPERDiNE L. REV. 297 (1982), or simply
"other crimes" evidence. See, e.g., Ralph C. Thomas, Looking Logically at Evidence of Other Crimes in Okla-
homa, 15 OKLA. L. REV. 431 (1962) . Since the concept involves conduct that is not necessarily a crime, the
term "other crimes" is somewhat misleading, although the vast majority of such evidence does in fact involve
"other crimes" and not just "wrongs" or "acts."
12. See IMwINKELREED, supra note 11, § 6:22. Even though the text refers to the use of uncharged mis-
conduct evidence in a criminal case, there is nothing in FRE 404(b) that prohibits the introduction of such
evidence in a civil case. Moreover, courts have applied the res gestae theory to permit the introduction of
such evidence in civil cases, although with much less frequency and with more restraint than in criminal
cases. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11, § 7:19.
13. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) and OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2804(b) (1991).
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 33 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol33/iss1/15
GOOD-BYE TO RES GESTAE
single criminal episode and that the jurors could not adequately evaluate the
charged crime without the contextual evidence provided by the uncharged mis-
conduct. 4 By way of example, it has been held that in a prosecution for the
charged crime of drunk driving, it was permissible for the prosecution to intro-
duce evidence that the defendant was carrying a pistol at the time of his arrest,
which was conduct for which the defendant had not been charged.' Since the
drunk driving and the possession of the pistol occurred simultaneously, they
were considered part of the same transaction or "things done" and were thus all
admissible.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma has also used the res gestae
doctrine to explain the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence. In Mason
v. State, the Court explained that other crimes constitute res gestae if they are
"so connected with other offenses as to form a part of an 'entire
transaction' ... ;" have a logical or visible connection to the offense charged,
tend to prove a material fact in issue ... ; show [defendant's] conduct as an
occurrence forming an integral part of the transaction.., which completed the
picture of the offense charged;19 or, are relevant to prove the essential elements
of the offense charged as matters incidental to the main fact and explanatory of
it.
2 0
CRITICISM OF RES GESTAE
Even when the development of the term res gestae was in its infancy,
Thayer reported that "there were signs that it was not altogether regarded with
favor." He wrote that the res gestae doctrine became popular because of its
"convenient obscurity."' During a time when the law of hearsay was unset-
tled, it was easier and more convenient to use this vague term to provide "relief
in a pinch" rather than to "stop to analyze" the hearsay issue involved.' Al-
though this very vagueness has been credited with allowing the development of
the hearsay doctrine by permitting the admissibility of heargay statements in
14. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11, § 6:22.
15. See id., citing Ross v. State, 334 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Crim.App. 1960). Other examples cited include
Dickson v. State, 642 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) ( in a prosecution for unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle, it was permissible to show that there were stolen ice bags in the vehicle) and Kolbert v. State, 644
S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (in a robbery prosecution, evidence that the defendant had pill bottles
and narcotics was admissible).
16. 868 P.2d 724 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
17. Brner v. State, 612 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
18. Id.
19. Cooper v. State, 765 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988), overruled in part on other grounds,
and Williams v. State, 794 P.2d 759, 763 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990).
20. Id.
21. WIGMORE, supra note 4. Thayer reported that Phillpps' excellent treatise on evidence, published in
1814, referred to hearsay being admitted as part of the res gestae. Phillipps then removed the phrase from his
next four editions and did not use the phrase again until his eighth edition, published in 1838.
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new situations,24 Tayer wrote, as early as 1881, that "this was a dangerous
way of finding relief, and judges, text-writers, and students have found them-
selves sadly embarrassed by the growing and intolerable vagueness of the ex-
pression."
Wigmore has also been highly critical of the use of the phrase res gestae.
He has written that it is "not only entirely useless, but even positively harm-
ful."' The phrase is useless because "every rule of Evidence to which it has
ever been applied exists as a part of some other well-established principle and
can be explained in the terms of that principle."27 The phrase is harmful be-
cause "by its ambiguity it invites the confusion of one rule with another and
thus creates uncertainty as to the limitations of both." Thus, Wigmore con-
cluded that the "shibboleth," res gestae, "should never be mentioned." 9
As indicated previously, the concept of res gestae has evolved into the
hearsay exceptions that we now recognize as present sense impressions," ex-
cited utterances,3 ' and statements of then existing mental, emotional, or physi-
cal condition.3 Thus, as Wigmore concluded, res gestae is a "part of some
other well-established principle and can be explained in the terms of that princi-
ple."'33 As a result, any analysis of the admissibility of spontaneous statements
should proceed under the more precise hearsay exceptions now recognized
rather than under the imprecise phrase res gestae.
Although most of the criticism leveled at the phrase res gestae has con-
cerned the use of the phrase in relation to the hearsay rule, the criticism applies
equally to the use of the phrase in relation to the; admissibility of evidence of
uncharged misconduct. With respect to this application of the res gestae doc-
trine, Wigmore wrote that it is "most frequently used as a cover for loose ideas
and ignorance of principles."'34 Since the rules of evidence35 currently permit
evidence of contemporaneously committed uncharged misconduct evidence for a
purpose other than to prove character, such as intent, motive, or design "let
legal discussion sedulously avoid this much-abused and wholly unmanageable
Latin phrase."36
24. See MCCORMICK, supra note 5.
25. WIGMORE, supra note 4.




30. See supra note 7.
31. See supra note 8.
32. See supra note 9.
33. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1767.
34. JOHN WIGMORE, IA WIGMORE ON EvIDENcE §218 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983).
35. See FED. R. EviD. 404(B) and OKLA. STAT. tit 12, § 2404(B) (1991).
36. WIGMORE, supra note 8.
[Vol. 33:349
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USE OF RES GESTAE BY OKLAHOMA COURTS
Prior to the adoption of the Oklahoma Evidence Code on October 1, 1978,
the phrase res gestae was widely used by the Oklahoma courts to explain the
admissibility of certain hearsay statements and uncharged misconduct evidence.
A Westlaw search indicates that the phrase appeared in approximately 187 cases
from 1945 to 1978. Since the phrase res gestae does not appear in the Oklaho-
ma Evidence Code, it might have been expected that the use of the phrase
would have appeared much less frequently after the adoption of the Code. How-
ever, the phrase has appeared in another 100 cases decided between 1978 and
1997.37
Most of the pre-code decisions that utilized the phrase res gestae to explain
the admissibility of hearsay evidence applied the phrase to spontaneous state-
ments that would now be classified as present sense impressions,38 excited ut-
terances, 9 or statements of then existing mental, emotional, or physical condi-
tion.' For example, in Sands Springs Ry. Co. et al. v. Piggee,4' the Oklaho-
ma Supreme Court, in a case involving an accident between a bus and an inter-
urban car, held that a statement about the cause of the accident, made at the
scene of the accident "at a time when tension and excitement due to the acci-
dent was still high,"'42 was admissible as part of the res gestae. The same state-
ment would now be classified as an excited utterance.43 And in Lee v. Volks-
wagen of America, Inc.,' the same court held that the plaintiff's statement
made after an accident, that he felt like committing suicide, could be admitted
under the res gestae exception. Such a statement would qualify as a statement
of a then existing mental or emotional condition under the Oklahoma Evidence
Code.4'
Numerous pre-code cases also utilized the phrase res gestae to explain the
admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence which would now likely be
37. Even though the Oklahoma Evidence Code became effective on October 1, 1978, some appellate
decisions appearing after that date were in cases that had been tried under the law of evidence in effect before
the Evidence Code. Thus, some of those 100 decisions were not using the phrase res gestae to refer to any
evidence concepts contained in the Code, but rather to pre-Code terminology. For example, in Lee v. Volks-
wagen, 688 P2d 1283 (Okla. 1994), the Oklahoma Supreme Court specifically held that since the trial in the
instant case was before the enactment of the Oklahoma Evidence Code, a statement could be classified as
falling under the res gestae exception.
38. See supra note 7.
39. See supra note 8.
40. See supra note 9.
41. 163 P.2d 545 (Okla. 1945).
42. Id. at 547.
43. See supra note 8. Both the driver of the interurban car and his employer were the named defendants
in the case. Since the driver was the declarant of the statement about the cause of the accident, and it was
being offered by the plaintiff, the statement would now also be admissible as an admission of a party oppo-
nent under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2801(4)(b)(1) and(4).
44. 688 P.2d at 1291. Although the decision was rendered after the adoption of the Oklahoma Evidence
Code, the opinion specifically stated that since the trial was held before the adoption of the code the statement
would be classified as falling under the res gestae exception.
45. See supra note 9.
1997]
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admissible, or at least analyzed, under §2404(B).' As the Court of Criminal
Appeals has explained in an earlier definition, "ft]he term 'Res Gestae' means
matters incidental to the main fact and explanatory to it, including acts and
words which are so closely connected therewith as to constitute a part of the
transaction, and without a knowledge of which the main fact might not be prop-
erly understood. . ."' For example, in Hall v. State," the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals held, in a case charging reckless driving, that evidence of
the driver's intoxication was admissible as part of the res gestae to help explain
the cause of the reckless driving. And in Dixon v. State," the same court held,
in a case charging assault with intent to commit rape, that evidence that just be-
fore the assault the defendant urinated upon the dining room table was admissi-
ble as part of the res gestae because it was "contemporaneous with and a part,
of the physical assault upon the victim by the defendant."5 Likewise, in a ho-
micide prosecution, Austin v. State,5 the court approved the admissibility of
evidence that the defendant cut another person shortly before he stabbed the
deceased as part of the res gestae, because it was explanatory of defendant's
motive and it showed the actions, conduct and general demeanor of the defen-
dant.
52
The Evidence Subcommittee's Note to § 2803 of the Oklahoma Evidence
Code states: "In no instance in these rules is the term 'res gestae' employed."'3
The Note further pointed out that the "vagueness and imprecision in the term
'res gestae' and the circumstances under which it should be employed to admit
otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence affords a convenient escape from the
hearsay doctrine. . . ."' As a result, the Note then declared that "'res gestae'
is specifically abandoned in these rules as an exception to the hearsay rule in
favor of the more specific categories of exceptions recognized herein."55 The
courts of Oklahoma have followed the suggestion of the Subcommittee Note
and have generally refrained from using the term res gestae as a hearsay excep-
tion. In the only Supreme Court opinion to use the phrase since the adoption of
the Evidence Code, the Court in Lee v. Volkswagen specifically held that a
46. See supra note 11.
47. Hathcox v. State, 230 P.2d 927, 935 (Okla. Crim. App. 1951).
48. 159 P.2d 283, 287 (Okla. Crim. App. 1945).
49. 560 P.2d 204 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
50. Id at 206.
51. 228 P. 1113, 1114-15 (Okla. Crim. App. 1924).
52. For other examples of pre-Code res gestae cases, see Wallace A. McLean, Note, Evidence: Admis.
sibility of Other Offenses in Oklahoma, 13 OKLA. L. REV. 68, 70-71 (1960).
53. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.12, § 2803 Evidence Subcommittee's Note. The Oklahoma Bar Association
appointed the "Subcommittee on Evidence" to develop an evidence code for Oklahoma. The Subcommittee,
after working for 4 years produced an evidence code that closely followed the FED. R. EVID. . Although the
Oklahoma Legislature did not immediately act on the Subcommittee's draft, a committee established pursuant
to the May 3, 1976 Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 69 endorsed the Subcommittee's draft as its own. That
draft passed in the spring of 1978 and became effective on October 1, 1978. The Evidence Subcommittee's
Notes were published in the Oklahoma Statutes Annotated. See FRANK T. READ, OKLAHOMA EVIDENCE
HANDBOoK: A PRACrToNER's GuIDE TO THE OKLAHOMA EVIDENCE CODE AND TO THE FEDERAL RULES Op
EvIDENE xv-xviii (Oklahoma Bar Review 1979).
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statement could be classified as falling under the res gestae exception only
because the trial in the case had occurred prior to the adoption of the Oklahoma
Evidence Code.56 The Court of Criminal Appeals has also acknowledged that
the res gestae exception was eliminated in the context of hearsay 7 and has
suggested that the hearsay concept was "formerly referred to as res gestae." 8
Thus, both the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals
have essentially eliminated the use of the phrase res gestae in relation to hear-
say.
The same cannot be said, however, with respect to use of the phrase in the
context of the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence. Almost all of
the approximately 100 uses of the phrase res gestae since the adoption of the
Evidence Code have been in reference to uncharged misconduct evidence. De-
spite the fact that the phrase res gestae does also not appear in § 2404(B) of the
Oklahoma Evidence Code, the Court of Criminal Appeals continues to use the
phrase with reference to the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence,
which should otherwise be regulated by that section. As the Court stated as
recently as 1994, "[olur post-Evidence Code cases leave no doubt as to the con-
tinuing vitality of the res gestae exception in the context of other crimes evi-
dence." 9 Although in the same opinion the court ackowledged that "confusion
exists as to the scope of the res gestae exception."
At least part of the explanation for this seeming discrepancy between the
abandonment of the phrase with respect to hearsay and its persistent use in the
context of uncharged misconduct evidence lies in the Evidence Subcommittee's
Notes. As noted above,6 the Subcommittee's Note accompanying § 2803, con-
cerning hearsay exceptions, specifically abandoned the use of the phrase with
respect to hearsay exceptions. However, the Note accompanying § 2404(B),62
after stating that all of the other purposes mentioned in the rule were previously
recognized in Oklahoma, went on to question whether the previously recognized
res gestae exception would be recognized under the new rule. The Court has
acknowledged that this statement "expressed doubt" about the continuing vital-
ity of the phrase res gestae in the context of other crimes evidence.63 Since the
Note was not as specific about abandoning the phrase in this context as it was
in the hearsay context, however, the Court has persisted in the use of the phrase
in the context of uncharged misconduct evidence. Of course, the Note statement
that the term res gestae does not appear anywhere in the Evidence Code is as
true of § 2404(3) as it is of § 2803.
Another misconception apparently accounts for the continued use of the
56. 688 P.2d at 1291.
57. Lalli v. State, 870 P.2d 175, 177 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
58. Gore v. State, 735 P.2d 576, 578 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987).
59. Lalli, 870 P.2d at 177.
60. Id.
61. See text accompanying note 54.
62. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 12, §2404 Evidence Subcommittee's Note.
63. Lali, 870 P.2d at 177.
1997]
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phrase res gestae in the context of uncharged misconduct evidence. The Court
occasionally seems to suggest that admission of evidence of res gestae is not
the same as admission of other crimes evidence. For example, in Rogers v.
State," the Court agreed that certain evidence had been admitted "as part of
the res gestae, rather than as other crimes evidence." The evidence involved
in Rogers concerned the purchase and use of crack cocaine, admitted in a rob-
bery prosecution. That is clearly evidence of "other crimes" and calling it res
gestae does not remove it from § 2404(B). That section is conacerned with the
admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts that might tend to prove
character to prove an act in conformity. The section prohibits that use, but then
suggests that some other purpose might be permissible. Whether that purpose is
one of those specifically mentioned in the rule or one of the purposes cited for
the use of res gestae evidence, it is still "other crimes" evidence. Unfortunately,
the Court's attempt to characterize res gestae as something other than "other
crimes" evidence regulated by § 240403) seems to perpetuate the use of res
gestae as a concept separate from and unregulated by the Evidence Code.'s
USE OF "RES GESTAE" SHOULD BE ABANDONED
The Court of Criminal Appeals should abandon the use of the phrase res
gestae and simply analyze any contemporaneously committed conduct the same
as evidence of any other crime, wrong or act. The Court already utilizes the
proper method of analysis envisioned by the Evidence Code. As indicated in
Knighton v. State,67 in order for evidence of uncharged misconduct to be ad-
missible, it must be probative of some purpose other than character."3 Once
some other probative purpose has been identified, the court must then weigh
that probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice (which will usually
be the danger that the jurors will in fact use it for the prohibited character pur-
pose) as provided in § 2403 of the Evidence Code.69 Unless the danger of un-
fair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value, the evidence of the
uncharged misconduct should be admitted. Thus, instead of calling the evidence
res gestae the court should examine one of the probative purposes for which res
gestae evidence is supposedly admissible. For example, the Court often says
that res gestae evidence is admissible because it puts the charged crime in per-
spective and helps the* jurors better understand the case." If that is true then
64. 890 P.2d 959 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
65. Id. at 971 (emphasis added).
66. This is not to suggest that the Court always does this. Sometimes the Court quite properly analyzes
alleged res gestae evidence under §§ 2404(B) and 2403 just as it does any other "other crimes" evidence. See,
e.g., Knighton v. State, 912 P.2d 878 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996).
67. 912 P.2d 878 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996).
68. See id.
69. OKLA. STAT. tit 12 § 2403 (1991) provides that "[rielevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, needless presentation of cumulative evidence, or unfair and harmful surprise.'
70. See supra note 20.
[Vol. 33:349
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the evidence has permissible probative value which should then be weighed
against the danger of unfair prejudice. Calling such evidence res gestae just
evades the appropriate analysis.
Replacing res gestae with the above suggested analysis does not necessari-
ly mean that the cases will be decided any differently. In Mason v. State,7 the
defendant was charged with first-degree manslaughter by virtue of having killed
someone while driving under the influence. The Court of Criminal Appeals
approved the admission of evidence that prior to the accident, the defendant had
been driving through stop signs with her lights off and with an open container
in the car. In concluding that such evidence was admissible as part of the res
gestae of the charged offense, the court analyzed the evidence under the defini-
tion of res gestae.' The Court pointed out that the evidence of the open con-
tainer tended to prove that she was driving under the influence which was a
"material fact in issue."'' The evidence that the defendant had been driving
through stop signs with her headlights off was "relevant to prove the essential
elements of the offense charged."74
The same analysis would apply under § 2404(B). The court would need to
identify a permissible probative purpose other than character, which would be
exactly the same ones identified by the court in Mason. The court would then
need to weigh the probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice to
determine ultimate admissibility. The case would most certainly come out the
same way under both the res gestae and probative value-prejudicial effect analy-
ses.
Since the Oklahoma Evidence Code requires that the admission of evi-
dence be analyzed under §§ 2404(B) and 2403, there is nothing to be gained by
calling the evidence res gestae. What would be gained by dropping the phrase,
however, would be clarity of analysis. Thus, the phrase res gestae should be
eliminated from any future discussion of the admissibility of uncharged miscon-
duct evidence, just as it has been eliminated in the hearsay context.
71. 868 P.2d at 725.
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